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the simulations show that a two-good model with total factor produc-
tivity shocks and nominal exchange rate shocks can account for most
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11 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest for the Great Depression
of the 1930s. In a seminal contribution, Cole and Ohanian (1999) have for
the ﬁrst time applied the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) analysis to the
interpretation of the US Great Depression. Thereafter, several authors have
entered this promising ﬁeld, with major contributions by Bordo, Erceg, and
Evans (2000), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004), Cole and Ohanian
(2004), Kehoe and Prescott (2002), Weder (2006), among others.1 For all
the questions that such a methodology arises in historical analysis,2 it is
doubtless that the emergence of this new stream of literature has opened
interesting new perspectives on the theme.
A controversial feature of this literature is its main focus on a closed-
economy, nation-by-nation analysis. Although the international dimension
of the Great Depression has long been recognised as a fundamental trait of
the event by historians,3 DGE macroeconomists have instead mostly con-
centrated on idiosyncratic shocks for single countries in a closed-economy
perspective.4
The aim of this paper is to move this literature one step forward, by
taking in consideration an open-economy scenario for the analysis of the
Belgian case.
To encompass the open-economy dimension is likely to be important for
Belgium. Openness to international trade in goods and services has tradi-
tionally been a distinctive feature of the Belgian economy. Data shows that
during the 1930s both the ratios imports/output and exports/output were
around 30%, a high value by the standards of the time.5 In 1931, Belgium was
the ﬁfth world exporter, after the United States, Germany, Great Britain and
France.6 There is unanimity among historians on the fact that a complete
understanding of the Belgian Great Depression cannot be achieved without
considering the additional constraints that bound Belgium as a consequence
of its open-economy nature.7
Accordingly, the Belgian case is in principle suitable for analysis within
the small-open-economy framework in modern macroeconomics. Originally
1See Pensieroso (2007b) for a survey.
2See De Vroey and Pensieroso (2006) and Temin (2008).
3Kindleberger (1973) Eichengreen and Temin (2000).
4Besides the works quoted in the main text, Beaudry and Portier (2002) deal with
France, Cole and Ohanian (2002) with the United Kingdom, Fisher and Hornstein (2002)
with Germany, Pensieroso (2007a) with Belgium.
5Data taken from Buyst (1997).
6See Vanthemsche (1987).
7See Cassiers (1989), Hogg (1986), Mommen (1994).
2advanced by Mendoza (1991) in a pure real-business-cycle (RBC) set up, this
class of models was recently extended by Gal` ı and Monacelli (2005) to a New
Keynesian framework, encompassing imperfect competition, price stickiness
and monetary policy.
Section 3 considers the eﬀects of unexpected TFP shocks in a model where
the economy trades only in bonds with the rest of the world and takes the
interest rate as given. Results shows that the pure intertemporal dimension
stressed by Mendoza’s analysis might have played a role in accounting for
the Great Depression in Belgium.
To enrich this initial analysis, the rest of the paper takes up the challenge
to adapt the model to the peculiarities of the Belgian industrial structure, as
they have been singled out by the historians.
According to Cassiers (1989), the interwar Belgian economy can be thought
of as sharply divided into two macro sectors, the domestic and the interna-
tional sector. These two sectors were diﬀerent under many respects, ranging
from labour unionization to capital intensity, from the average ﬁrm dimen-
sion to the price setting process. Hence, the argument runs, the two sectors
behaved diﬀerently during the Depression. In particular, they responded dif-
ferently to the deﬂationary pressure of the 1930s. Figure 1 shows evidence for
diﬀerent price indices. While the cost-of-living, the retail and the wholesale
price indices all decreased appreciably between 1929 and 1934, the wholesale
price index plummeted more dramatically than the other two. As it is tra-
ditionally retained that the wholesale price reﬂects more the prices of goods
that are traded internationally, while both the cost-of-living and the retail
prices put more weight on domestic goods, this feature suggests that the
deﬂation of the 1930s hit more the international than the domestic sector.
At the light of this argument, an appropriate way to model Belgium in
the interwar era might be to consider an open economy with two sectors, one
producing tradeable, the other non tradeable goods. This is the way I shall
explore in Section 4, drawing inspiration from the work by Stockman and
Tesar (1995).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I shall brieﬂy
present selected data for the interwar Belgium. In Section 3, I shall dis-
cuss a ﬁrst exercise based on the Mendoza’s one-good open-economy RBC
framework. Section 4 extends the analysis to a benchmark two-sector, open-
economy model. In Section 5, I shall present a simple framework encom-
passing nominal exchange rate shocks. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the
argument and draws some preliminary conclusions.
32 History and data
The traditional story about the Great Depression in Belgium focuses on the
exchange rate system.8 After the Depression spread from the United States
to Europe, Belgium decided to stick to the Gold Standard, together with
France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such a
decision was natural, as Belgium orbited around France, and France feared
the inﬂationary pressure that could result from a devaluation. On the other
hand, it was also a problematic decision to take, with respect to what was
contemporaneously happening in the United Kingdom. The United King-
dom, a major commercial partner for Belgium, exited the Gold Standard as
early as in 1931. This put the big Belgian ﬁrms producing for the British
market in an uneasy position. As they where price takers abroad, their selling
price in sterling was ﬁxed. However, as the sterling lost value with respect
to the Belgian franc, their proﬁtability was suddenly diminished. In facts,
many of them faced big losses. To ease the situation of the export sector
and yet keep the Belgian franc anchored to the Gold Standard, the Belgian
Government implemented a series of deﬂationary measures. These included
measures of public ﬁnance like increases in income tax, indirect taxes and
tariﬀs, or reductions in pensions and unemployment beneﬁts. Other mea-
sures were more directly targeted to lowering the production costs at home,
in particular wages. Wage earners opposed a ﬁerce resistance to wage reduc-
tion, even if, eventually, they accepted signiﬁcant drops in the nominal wage.
The unemployment rate jumped up from 1.7% in 1929 to 20.2% in 1932
(Goossens (1988)). The situation got worse and worse until the Government
decided to abandon the Gold Bloc, and devaluated the Belgian franc by 28%,
following the advise by the Louvain School. The devaluation prompted the
recovery, with output exceeding its 1929 value already in 1937.
This traditional account ﬁnds support from the raw data.
Figure 1 shows the exchange rate of the Belgian franc with the British
pound and the French franc. The value of the Belgian franc in terms of the
British pound increased steadily from 1930 to 1934, to decrease after the
1935 devaluation. The value of the Belgian franc with respect to the French
franc was ﬁxed until 1934. It decreased between 1935 and 1936, to increase
soon after the French devaluation.
The deﬂationary pressure induced by an overvalued franc, and reinforced
by the deﬂationary policy of the Belgian government is evident from the price
and interest rates data. The early 1930s were a period of strong deﬂation,
with the retail (‘cpi’), cost-of-living and wholesale (‘ppi’) price indices all
8See Baudhuin (1946) and Cassiers (1995).
4falling dramatically till 1934, and increasing a bit after the 1935 devaluation
of the Belgian Franc. As already mentioned above, the dynamics of the
wholesale price index is much more accentuated than that of the other two.
Nominal interest rates were decreasing until 1931, then increasing till 1933
and then slightly decreasing till 1937. The behaviour of the real interest rate
reﬂects the strong deﬂationary pressure. The real interest rate was high and
positive in the early 1930s, and negative after the 1935 devaluation of the
Belgian franc.
The real side of the economy suﬀered from a dramatic downturn as well.
Figure 2 shows data about output and its components (top-right panel).
According to these data, Belgium entered the Great Depression after 1931.
In 1934, real output (‘gnp’ in the graph) was 10% below the 1929 level. The
ﬁgure was 40 % for investments (‘i’), 20% for exports (‘x’), 17% for imports
(‘m’). Consumption (‘c’) witnessed only a minor decrease.
Employment (‘l’) dropped cumulatively of a good 20%, to witness a slight
tendency to recovery from 1934 onwards. Nominal wages decreased by 20%
between 1929 and 1935. Such a decrease was not enough to cope with the
decreasing prices. Consequently, real wages increased by about 10% in the
same period. After 1935, both the nominal and the real wage series increased
appreciably.
The fact that output starts decreasing only in 1931, and the increasing
pattern of all the real aggregate variables but for consumption after 1935
look like a vindication of the traditional view about the monetary origins
of the Great Depression in Belgium, although the persistent high level of
unemployment is hard to explain within that framework.
However, if we look at the evidence through the lens of neoclassical theory,
i.e. by looking at the data in deviations from trend, a diﬀerent picture
emerges (top-left panel).9
In eﬀect, according to this theory-based inspection of the evidence, Bel-
gium entered the Great Depression soon after 1929, with the major drop in
output being between 1930 and 1934. After that, output stayed constantly
below the trend, showing no sign of recovery.
Investments decreased sharply all over the decade, up to being 65% below
trend in 1939.
The depression did not aﬀect consumption before 1931, when the series
9Data have been detrended using a linear ﬁlter, as in Cole and Ohanian (1999). Specif-
ically, I have measured the average growth factor of the Belgian economy in the 20th
century, after excluding World Wars I and II and the Great Depression as well. Then,
after assuming 1929 as the base year, I have taken the measured trend out of the data. Ob-
viously, neither the labour series nor the prices are detrended. The detrending technique
is explained more in details in Pensieroso (2007a).
5start decreasing. Thereafter, consumption followed a decreasing path, being
almost 20% below trend in 1939.
Real wages (‘w’) were above trend in the early 1930s, but below trend
from 1933 on.
The current account deﬁcit was increasing at the beginning of the period,
as exports fell faster than the decreasing imports.10 Things are diﬀerent for
the late 1930s, when the faster recovery of exports with respect to imports
implies a decreasing deﬁcit in 1935, and an increasing surplus from 1936 until
the end of the period. The terms of trade, here deﬁned as the price of exports
over the price of imports, had a swinging pattern, increasing till 1933, then
decreasing till 1936, then increasing again.
3 The one-good model
There are two kind of gain from international trade, the intertemporal and the
infratemporal gain. The intertemporal gain stems from the fact that inter-
national trade enlarges the possibility for a country to smooth consumption
over time. The infratemporal gain relates to comparative advantages among
countries producing diﬀerent goods.
In order to provide a throughout assessment of the role of international
factors in accounting for the Great Depression in Belgium, I shall explore the
two aspects separately. I shall ﬁrst study a model with intertemporal gains
from trade only. A viable candidate is a standard small-open-economy RBC
framework with technology shocks.11 In a second step, I shall delve into the
issues related to the infratemporal gains from trade, introducing a two-good
open-economy framework. Finally, the two aspects will be both taken into
account in a more general model.
3.1 The model
The model economy produces one good, Y , using capital K and labour L,






It is assumed that the economy can exchange assets with the rest of the
world. These assets pay a constant real interest rate r∗. The small-open-
10Belgium current account was in deﬁcit (between 2% and 4% of GNP) throughout the
1929-1935 period and in surplus (between 1% and 2% of GNP) later on.
11The model is similar to Mendoza (1991).
6economy assumption implies that the domestic economy cannot inﬂuence
the value of r∗. No labour migration is allowed.
Let bt be the value of per-capita net foreign assets held by the representa-
tive household at the end of period t−1. I deﬁne the current account balance
in period t, CAt, as the variation of the net claims of a country over the rest
of the world:
CAt ≡ bt+1 − bt.
The economy is populated by inﬁnitely living representative households,
who choose per-capita consumption, c, and leisure, 1 − l, so as to maximise








t [ln(ct)+φln(1 − lt)], (2)
under the constraints:














In the formulation above, lowercase letters stand for per capita.
The economy is trend stationary, with γ being the growth factor of the
labour augmenting technological progress, µ. I assumed that the stochastic
component of total factor productivity, es, follows an autoregressive process
of order one. The residuals from such a process, v, are the technology shock
I will feed in the model.
I assume rational expectations. Computing the ﬁrst order conditions
of this problem, and detrending all the variable, the relevant equations for
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Equation (4) is a no-arbitrage condition between home capital and bonds,
whereas Equations (3), (5) and (6) are the open-economy version of the
standard Euler equation, budget constraint and labour supply, respectively.
The steady state of this class of open-economy models turns out to be
consistent with any initial level of net assets (Correia, Neves, and Rebelo
(1995), Kim and Kose (2003)). This multiple-equilibria feature introduces a
stationarity problem in the model: at steady state, a country with higher net
assets holdings will be able to aﬀord higher trade deﬁcits, and therefore higher
consumption levels. As a consequence, any shock, even if trend-stationary,
will have permanent eﬀects on assets and therefore on consumption. This
introduces a random-walk component in the model.
Many ways exist to solve this problem (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003)).
I chose to impose a risk premium on the real interest rate paid or received
by the domestic economy. The idea is that the lower the net asset holding of
the country, or, when b is negative, the higher its foreign debt, the higher the
interest rate it has to pay to borrow more will be. So, in the model above,
we can substitute r∗ with
rt = r
∗ + ψ(e
−bt − 1). (7)
This formulation stationarises the model, as the steady state level of b is
now determined by the Euler equation, and turns out to be a function of r∗
and ψ only.
3.2 Calibration and simulation
The model’s structural parameters are calibrated as shown in Table 1. The
unit period is the year. The parameters α, the capital share in the Cobb
Douglas production function, and δ, the depreciation rate of capital, are
ﬁxed accordingly, as in Cole and Ohanian (1999).
The parameter β is calibrated so that the steady-state real interest rate,
net of the depreciation rate δ is equal to 5.6%, which is the average measured
value for Belgium in the 1929-1938 period.
8The secular growth factor of the Belgian economy, γ, is obtained by taking
the average growth rate of the Belgian GDP per capita between 1900-1994,
excluding World Wars I and II, and the Great Depression as well.
The preference for leisure, φ, is calibrated so that hours worked are 1/3
in equilibrium.
The autoregressive coeﬃcient of TFP, ρ, is calibrated by running an
AR(1) regression on the log of the measured detrended TFP.
The calibration of the parameter ψ was somewhat problematic. The 0.001
value was chosen so that the absolute value of the negative interest rate
diﬀerential between Belgium and the rest of the World does not exceed 10
basis points, which is the limit spread suggested by Benigno and Thoenissen
(2006).12
The steady-state world interest rate is given at r∗ =
γ
β − 1. I assume the
economy to be in steady state in 1929. In the model, the steady-state value
of current account is assumed to be 0, as are the initial and steady-state
values of net foreign assets. I feed in the vector of TFP shocks obtained after
regressing the log of detrended TFP as an AR(1).13
Figure 3 shows the results of this simulation, and compare them with the
result of a simulation run on the closed-economy version of this model, e.g.
the same model without bonds, where the interest rate is endogenous.
The model is able to account for about 35% of the peak-to-trough drop
in the output data, and for almost 50% of the consumption drop.
The model fully accounts for the behaviour of investments in the 1929-
1934 period. After 1934, the investment patterns in the model is far too
volatile to be compared to the data.14
12I considered also two other possible values: 0.465, the value that allows the model to
match the standard deviation of CA
Y in the data; and 0.000742, the value for a similar model
calibrated by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) on contemporary Canadian data. In the
case of ψ =0 .465, results show that the model overlaps with the closed-economy version.
In the case ψ =0 .000742, the model’s reaction to the TFP shock is more pronounced than
in the benchmark calibration. This leads to conclude that the lower the value of ψ,t h e
stronger the autocorrelation in the variable b, and therefore the stronger the propagation
mechanism of the model. All in all, the benchmark value chosen in the text is conservative,
although in line with the accepted practice in the literature, which is to assign a low value
to this parameter.
13Simulations are run assuming rational expectations, but not perfect foresight of the
shock. Agents are surprised by the contemporary shock, and assume future shocks to be
zero. Kehoe and Prescott (2008) refers to this assumption as myopic foresight.
14Such a feature is in full accordance with standard results in the literature: small-open-
economy RBC models tend to accentuate the investments volatility. The typical small open
economy RBC model encompasses adjustment costs on capital to obviate this problem.
Intuitively, the presence of adjustment costs on capital will kill the excess volatility shown










Table 1: Calibration of parameters
The labour dynamics is not accounted for by the model.
As is evident from the comparison with the closed-economy simulation,
the qualitative behaviour of the model economy is on the whole comparable to
that of a standard closed-economy RBC model. We notice, however, a slight
improvement in the quantitative dimension, especially as far as output and
consumption are concerned: generally speaking, the model is more responsive
to the impulse. The labour dynamics is poorly accounted for by both the
models, while the open-economy model fares much better in accounting for
the investment drop, yet at the price of having a too volatile investment
behaviour after 1934.
The open-economy model also improves slightly on its close-economy
counterpart in accounting for the long-duration of the Great Depression in
Belgium.
On the minus side, the fact that the model economy is now slightly more
responsive to the technological shock makes it more at variance with the data
than its closed-economy counterpart when the onset of the Great Depression
is concerned. In facts, both output and consumption accentuate their above-
trend path in the early 1930s.
From this exercise, I conclude that the extension of the closed-economy
analysis to a scenario that considers only the intertemporal gains from inter-
national trade is a useful reﬁnement of the model.
As the historians put much weight on the trade-related aspects of the
Great Depression in Belgium, next section is devoted to the task of enriching
this analysis, so as to take into account the infratemporal as well as the
intertemporal gains from trade.
predictive capacity of the model for the initial drop.
104 The two-good model
In this section, I shall introduce a two-sector structure in the model. The idea
is to allow the model economy to have the kind of sectorial unbalances that
are considered important by Cassiers (1989) and Hogg (1986) to understand
the Belgian Great Depression. To this end, I modelled the Belgian economy
as an open economy with two sectors, one producing a tradeable good, yT,
the other a non-tradeable one, yN.15 Production functions in both sectors





















The variable sj stands for total factor productivity in sector j,f o rj =
N,T. Both labour and capital are assumed to be mobile across sectors, but
not internationally. To begin with, and in order to isolate the eﬀects of the
infratemporal gains from trade only, I shall temporarily exclude assets from
the model. This means that the interest rate is endogenous.
The tradeable good can be exported, x, consumed, cT, or invested in
both the sectors. I labeled iT,j the tradeable good invested in sector j. The
non-tradeable good can be consumed, cN, or invested in both the sectors,
iN,j.
The economy imports consumption and investment goods, cM and iM
respectively.









Aggregate investment in sector j is expressed as a Cobb-Douglas index









All variables are per capita, and when suitable, detrended. Prices are
expressed in terms of the tradeable good, whose price is therefore taken as
the num´ eraire (pT = 1). I assumed perfect competition.
The model can be solved adopting a stepwise procedure. First, in each
period t, given preferences, endowments and technical conditions, households
15A similar model was proposed by Perri and Quadrini (2002) for the Great Depression
in Italy.
11determine the optimal allocation between diﬀerent kind of goods, given the
total amount of consumption and investment. This problem is static by its
nature.
Second, households have to decide how to allocate wealth intertemporally,
thereby determining the consumption and savings plans. This is the dynamic
part of the model.
The two parts together fully determine the intertemporal path of all the
variables involved.
4.1 The static problem
4.1.1 Firms











given the constraints (8) and (9). In the proﬁt equation (12), pi,j is the price
index for aggregate investment in sector j, and will be deﬁned later on.
The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem gives the demand schedules




















Given total consumption ct, households choose to consume non-tradeable,








The solution to this problem gives the infratemporal demand for cN, cT





pN ;( 1 7 )
c
T = bccp
c;( 1 8 )
c
M =
(1 − ac − bc)cpc
pM . (19)
The price index pc is deﬁned as the minimum expenditure Z ≡ pcc such






(ac)ac(bc)bc(1 − ac − bc)
1−ac−bc. (20)
The same procedure is implemented to ﬁnd the infratemporal demand
functions for the diﬀerent kind of investment goods, as well as for their price
indexes. Recall that in the following ij,N is the amount of the j-type invest-











(1 − ai,N − bi,N)(iN)(pi,N)






(ai,N)ai,N(bi,N)bi,N(1 − ai,N − bi,N)











(1 − ai,T − bi,T)(iT)(pi,T)






(ai,T)ai,T(bi,T)bi,T(1 − ai,T − bi,T)
1−ai,T−bi,T . (28)
134.2 The dynamic problem





















t ;( 3 0 )
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Here, I have assumed a log-log utility function in total consumption and
leisure.
The solution to problem (29) gives the rules for the intertemporal alloca-





























































t ;( 3 7 )
144.3 Equilibrium conditions
To close the model, I need to specify the demand for exports and the equi-
librium conditions for the trade account.










meaning that the trade account is balanced in any period. This is consistent
with the hypothesis of internationally immobile capital.
The speciﬁcation of the demand for export is somewhat troublesome, as









where ζ<0 is the elasticity of export demand from the rest of the world to
the terms of trade (remember that pT
t =1 ,∀t). The variable am stands for
the “autonomous” components of the export demand.
Finally, I need to add the equilibrium conditions equating the productions


















t + xt. (41)
4.4 Calibration
Table 2 shows the chosen calibration for the structural parameters of the
model.
The values of β, γ and δ are ﬁxed as in Section 3.
The values of ν and ι are calibrated so as to reproduce a speciﬁc aspect
of the Belgian interwar economy. According to Cassiers (1989), in 1930, the
international, or “unsheltered” sector employed 56% of the total number of
employees. I have taken this to mean that in the model, the ratio lT
l should
be 0.56 in steady state, and calibrated ν and ι accordingly. They turn out
to be 0.49 and 0.66 respectively. 16
16In Stockman and Tesar (1995), who estimate them as an average value for Germany,
Italy, USA, Canada and Japan, the values for ν and ι are 0.49 and 0.54, respectively.
Results from a simulation run with the values from Stockman and Tesar (1995) show no



















Table 2: Calibration of parameters.
The preference for leisure, φ, is calibrated so that in the steady state total
hours worked are 1/3 of total available time.
The autonomous component of export demand, am, is calibrated so that
pM = 1 in steady state.
The elasticity of export demand to the terms of trade, ζ, is ﬁxed to -1,
consistently with the Cobb-Douglas structure of the import demand.
The share parameters ac, bc, ai,N, bi,N, ai,T and bi,T are calibrated using
the 1965 input-output matrix for Belgium (Institut National de Statistique
(1970)). The attribution of sectors to the tradeable or non tradeable category
follows Plasmans, Michalak, and Fornero (2006). The parameters ac and bc
are computed as the share of domestic tradeable and non-tradeable goods
on total ﬁnal domestic consumption. The parameters ai,N, bi,N, ai,T and bi,T
are calibrated as follows. Using data for the gross ﬁxed capital formation,
I have computed the shares IM,N
IN , IM,T
IT , and IN










IT . Given that the share of imported investments in sector j,
IM,j
Ij , is the complement to 1 of ai,j and bi,j, and given the values of IN and
IT,f o rj =( N,T) I have a system of two equations that can be solved for
16ai,j and bi,j.17
I shall assume that the sectorial TFPs are subject to zero-mean i.i.d

















We do not have a clear-cut empirical counterpart for sectorial productivity
sN and sT. In their stead, I used the aggregate productivity shock estimated




t +( 1− λ)s
T
t ,
with λ =0 .49 being the weight of the on tradeable sector in the 1965
input-output matrix. I also took ρN and ρT from Pensieroso (2007a), assum-
ing that the sectorial autoregressive coeﬃcient for TFP is the same as the
one estimated there for the whole economy.
4.5 Impulse response functions
Before applying the model to the Great Depression in Belgium, it is useful
to study the impulse response functions (IRF) to the technology shock in
the tradeable sector. This will help our understanding of the working of this
model and the subsequent ones as well.
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 show the IRF of the model to a 1% standard deviation
positive shock to productivity in the tradeable sector vT
t . Only the variables
aﬀected by the shock are graphed.
The increase in productivity in the tradeable sector has an obvious direct
eﬀect on yT (‘yt’ in the graphs). Given the production function (9), this im-
plies an increase in labour and capital demand in the tradeable sector (‘lt’,
‘kt’). Obviously, as capital is a stock, it is the correspondent ﬂow variable to
bear the brunt of adjustment: investment in the tradeable sector (‘it’) must
17The use of modern data to single out the sectorial structure of the economy in the
1930s is obviously questionable. In particular, such a practice is likely to overestimate the
weight of the non tradeable sector, for the latter includes services, whose value added was
possibly higher in the 1960s than in the 1930s. For comparison, I report here the value
of the share parameters in the work by Perri and Quadrini (2002), who analyse the Great
Depression in Italy: ac =0 .6, bc =0 .2, ai,N =0 .6, bi,N =0 .2, ai,T =0 .3 and bi,T =2 /5.
(I thank Fabrizio Perri for providing me their Gauss code, from which I have deduced
those numbers).
17increase. Given the labour supply (37), wages in the tradeable sector must
increase to cope with the excess demand of labour. The increase in invest-
ment causes the interest rate in the tradeable sector (‘rt’) to increase, so as
to equate saving and investment, according to the Euler equation (35). Note
that, accordingly, the pattern of aggregate consumption (‘c’) is increasing in
time, before reverting toward the steady state.
The increased eﬃciency in the tradeable sector causes a decrease in the
price of the tradeable good. As the latter is the num´ eraire here, such a de-
crease will translate to an increase in all the other prices. This leads to a
substitution eﬀect from non-tradeable and imported goods towards trade-
ables. However, an income (wealth) eﬀect is also at work here. The increase
in the TFP of the tradeable sector makes households richer. They will buy
relatively more tradeable goods, but they will also buy more goods in general.
Moreover, as tradeable goods are used also in the accumulation of capital in
the non-tradeable sector, there is a further transmission mechanism for the
shock to inﬂuence the non-tradeable production (‘yn’) as well. This explains
why iN
t (‘in’) increases as well. Such a mechanism is reinforced by the fact
that also the accumulation of capital in the tradeable sector is made upon the
three goods, which in Equation (11) are assumed to be imperfect substitutes.
Note that Equations (36) and (37) ensure that wages in terms of trade-
able good are equal in both sector, which is a logical consequence of the
labour mobility assumption. Plugging such equality into the labour demands
(13) and (14) gives us a better understanding of what is happening in the
non-tradeable sector. As pN
t (‘pn’) is increasing, the wage in terms of non-
tradeable good - i.e. the labour cost in terms of production good - is decreas-
ing, which adds to the income eﬀect mentioned above, and helps to explain
why lN
t (‘lno’) increases even more than lT
t . Such a feature also explain why
both iN
t and rN
t (‘rn’) move more than iT
t and rT
t , respectively: the higher
level of employment implies an higher capital demand.
Concerning the trade account, total import m, deﬁned as m = cM +
iM,N + iM,T, is constant, meaning that its components move in such way to
oﬀset each other. The reason is that the increase in pM (‘pm’) causes export
(‘x’) to increase as well, as clear from equation (39). What is more, given
|ζ| = 1, export must move on a one-to-one basis with the price of import.
This requires the total amount of import to be constant, if the equilibrium
of the trade balance is to be preserved.
4.6 Simulation: the Great Depression
In this section, the time series of aggregate variables from the simulated
model are plotted against selected evidence on the Great Depression in Bel-
18gium. The objective is to assess how much of the Belgian Great Depression
can be accounted for by plugging the measured productivity shock into the
model developed above.
As this model is intended to test the view of the historians based on sec-
torial asymmetries and external shocks, I have assumed that the productivity
shock hit only the tradeable sector, and calibrated the vector sT such that
sT=s.
I assume that the economy was in steady state in 1929. Then, I fed in
the computed {vT}1939
1929 series, and run the simulation.
Results from the simulation are shown in Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 (green
line).
The measured pattern for the TFP shock is positive in the ﬁrst three years
of the Depression, and negative thereafter. This explains the qualitative be-
haviour of consumption, export, output in the tradeable sector, investment,
real wages and the price indices. In the model, all these variables witness a
boom in 1930-31, a pattern at variance with the data. The model-economy
do not return to trend after the 1935 devaluation, a pattern in accordance
with the data.
Quantitatively, the model fails to account for the dynamics of both capital
related variables and labour. In the model, the cumulative drop in consump-
tion between 1929 and 1934 in only about 2%, compared with more than 15%
in the detrended data. Results are better for what concerns output. The cu-
mulative drop of the tradeable production is about 12%, compared with an
overall fall in detrended output of over 20%. Output in the non-tradeable
sector barely moves in the simulation.
Export falls cumulatively of a good 10%, accounting for roughly a third
of the observed drop in the data. As expected, import do no move in the
model, whereas they decrease by almost 30% in the data.
Both the terms of trade and the consumption price index are accounted
for reasonably well, but for the initial downturn. On the contrary, the model
is not able to reproduce a key feature of the data, the pattern of the CPI/PPI
index, expressed in the model by pN
t .
The lesson to be drawn from this exercise is twofold. First, the two-
sector structure is a promising framework to analyse the Great Depression in
Belgium. It allows us to partially account for many trade-related variables
and price indices, while still being reasonably simple. Second, the absence
of bonds is a major shortcoming of the model. On top of implying a trade
balance constantly in equilibrium - which is at variance with the data -
such an assumption makes the model missing the behaviour of import by
construction. This suggests that the intertemporal gain from trade might
have played a non-negligible role for Belgium in the 1930s.
194.7 The model with bonds
For this reason, I shall now reintroduce the possibility for the model economy
to exchange assets with the rest of the world, as in Section 3. These assets
are denominated in terms of the tradeable good, and pay a constant real
interest rate of r∗, which is assumed to be exogenously determined. Using









t )+γbt+1 − bt, (44)
while the uncovered interest parity will hold, with the presence of a risk-







−bt − 1). (45)
The parameter ψ is calibrated as in Section 3.
Figures 12, 13, 14 and 15 show the IRF of the model to a 1% standard
deviation positive shock to TFP in the tradeable sector.
Compared to the previous exercise, we do not observe signiﬁcant changes
in the patterns of aggregate consumption, exports, real wages and the price
indices. However, there are obvious diﬀerences stemming from the diﬀerent
behaviour of imports. The higher demand for investment and the income
eﬀect on consumption both imply a higher demand for imported goods. The
economy ﬁnance the increase in import with a deﬁcit in the current account.
This explains why the price of import increases slightly less than in the
previous exercise. It also explains the short-lived increase in the interest rate
in the tradeable sector: the excess demand for investment is satisﬁed also
out of debt, and not entirely out of domestic saving anymore.
4.8 The model with bonds and real wage rigidity
A second suitable modiﬁcation of the benchmark model concerns the ﬂexible
price hypothesis adopted so far. Results suggest that we need some rigid-
ity (some additional ‘wedge’ in the sense of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007)) to strengthen the transmission mechanism of the model, and get a
better accounting of the data. If we look at the historical narrative, there
is evidence of wage rigidity in the tradeable sector. As I have recalled in
the Introduction, according to Cassiers (1989), the open-economy nature of
Belgium caused it to be sharply divided into a sheltered domestic sector and
an unsheltered international one. Those macro-sectors behaved diﬀerently
during the contraction. Following the British Pound devaluation in 1931,
ﬁrms in the international sector were forced to deﬂate product prices, con-
trary to what happened to the domestic sector, that was relatively isolated
20from the international turbulence. Consequently, ﬁrms in the international
sector asked for full-scale wage reductions, in order to cope with the shrinking
mark-up due to the price deﬂation. As the international sector was highly
unionised, such a call met with ﬁerce resistance by the workers. Hence, the
historical plausibility of the hypothesis of real wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector.
This section serves the scope of enriching the model with this additional
feature.
The simplest possible way of modelling sectorial real wage rigidity is to










Equation (46) makes real wages in the tradeable sector a weighted average
of the previous period sectorial real wage and the equilibrium sectorial real
wage, with κ being the proportion of the household that sticks to the previous
period wage.18 Obviously, the higher κ, the higher the percentage of workers
not behaving according to the max-utility-of-leisure criterion, and therefore
the stronger the rigidity I impose on the model. I calibrated the value of κ
by approximating it with the Union membership. We know from Cassiers
(1989) that Union membership in Belgium was above 35% by 1920. This
percentage increased by 28% between 1929 and 1933. A recent survey by
Blanchﬂower (2007) ﬁxes this value to 42% in 1970 and 55% at the end of
the 1990s. As I have assumed that lT
l is 0.56 in steady state, I have chosen κ
equal to 0.8, meaning that I assume that 80% and 44% of the labour force,
respectively in the tradeable sector and in the whole economy was unionised,
and consequently stuck to the previous period wage.19
To disentangle how the response of the model to the shock diﬀers from the
ﬂexible wage scenario, Figures 16, 17, 18 and 19 plot the IRF of the model
with bonds and real wage rigidity to a 1% standard deviation positive shock
to TFP in the tradeable sector. It is immediately evident that wage rigidity
18This oversimpliﬁed formulation only serves the scope of assessing the quantitative
relevance of the asymmetric wage rigidity hypothesis. As explained by Blanchard and
Gal` ı (2007), such a formulation is parsimonious and yet general, being compatible with
several models of wage rigidity. Moreover, one important feature of this formulation is
that wage staggering results from distortions and not from preferences, which leaves the
ﬁrst best solution unaﬀected.
19The benchmark value of the parameter κ in Blanchard and Gal` ı (2007) is 0.9. They
chose it such that half of the shock disappears in 6 periods. In their model, however, the
wage rigidity is not limited to one sector but concerns the entire economy, and the model
is calibrated on a quarterly basis. In my case, the chosen value implies that half of the
shock disappear in 2 years.
21in the tradeable sector enhances the quantitative response of the model to
the shock. Labour supply in the tradeable sector is now more elastic than
before, which makes hours worked in the tradeable sector increase more than
before. Consequently, part of the labour force shifts from the non-tradeable
to the tradeable sector. This causes wages to increase relatively more in
the non-tradeable sector, giving start to a recovery of hours worked in the
non-tradeable sector that actually overshoot the steady state level. Another
consequence of wage rigidity is the stronger increase in the price levels. This
is particularly important for the terms of trade (‘pm’), whose increase causes
export to increase more than in the benchmark case. Interestingly enough,
such an increase is not enough to compensate for the excess demand for
investment, resulting in an increased trade deﬁcit. The investment boom is
explained by capital accumulation in the tradeable sector.
We can now repeat the exercise of Section 4.6 with the modiﬁed model.
The black lines in Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 show the result from simulating this
model with bonds and real wage rigidity subject to the measured productivity
shock.
The introduction of bonds and sectorial real wage rigidity causes the
model to give an overall better accounting of the data. The model is in
particular relatively good in accounting for the behaviour of the terms of
trade and the consumption price index. It also has a better dynamics for
imports and exports. Imports are more than 5% below trend in 1934 in
the model, compared to a 30% in the data. For exports the numbers are a
bit less than 20% and almost 30% respectively. In the model, hours worked
drops cumulatively of a good 6%, compared with a 20% in the data. The
decrease in real wage in the non-tradeable sector is far stronger than what is
observed in the aggregate data, while the pattern of the tradeable real wage
mimics the aggregate one almost perfectly. The cumulative drop in output
in the tradeable sector account for almost 100% of the total output drop
in the data. Output in the non-tradeable sector barely moves at all. The
improvement over the benchmark model is almost not appreciable for what
concerns aggregate consumption, and minor for what concerns investment
and the real interest rates. The model is still not able to catch the
cpi
ppi relative
price behaviour. The simulations also show a far too volatile pattern for
many variables after the 1935 devaluation, suggesting that the perfect capital
mobility assumption needs to be edulcorated by some kind of adjustment
costs.
From this exercise, I conclude that a ‘wedge’ in the labour market and the
intertemporal gain from trade help the model to get a better data mimicking
ability. Still, there is room for improvement. The model is not able to
reproduce a major part of the behaviour of investment and consumption.
22Moreover, as TFP was above trend in 1930-31, we lack a plausible story for
the onset of the Great Depression.
So far, the analysis has neglected the monetary dimension. However,
monetary turbulencies over the nominal exchange rate has long been the
historians favourite explanation of the Great Depression in Belgium. Given
that the model formulated above in real terms does not fully account for the
data, next section investigates whether introducing money into the model is
a viable way to obtain better results.
5 The Role of the exchange rate: a simple
monetary framework
This section introduce a second impulse mechanism on top of the TFP shock
considered so far: the nominal exchange rate shock. The idea is to make
the model suitable to consider the eﬀects of the monetary policy carried out
by the National Bank of Belgium to stick to the Gold Standard. Such a
policy has traditionally been considered a major cause of the Belgian Great
Depression.
The model is the same as in Section 4.8, but for the choice of the num´ eraire.
Instead of measuring values in terms of the tradeable domestic good, which
is the meaning of the assumption pT = 1, I shall have variables expressed in
terms of Belgian Francs. This means that pT must be introduced back into
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1−ac−bc. (48)
All the equations concerning the tradeable sector are modiﬁed accord-
ingly.











The ﬁrst equation formalises what was previously implicit: in perfect
competition, and with no transportation costs the price in Belgian Francs
of the tradeable good exported abroad must be the same as the price in
23Belgian Francs of the tradeable good at home (law of one price). The second
equation applies the law on one price the foreign good: its price in Belgian
francs must be the same both in Belgium and abroad. The variable e is the
nominal exchange rate between the Belgian franc and the ‘currency’ of the
rest of the world. The latter should obviously be intended as a bundle of
currencies. The nominal exchange rate is expressed in terms of the foreign
currency (i.e. how many BF you need to have 1 unit of the bundle currency).
In the simulations, the value of e is determined as a trade-weighted average
of the nominal exchange rate between the Belgian Franc and a bundle of
currencies from France, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom and
the United States.20 The price of foreign tradeable good is assumed to be
constant and exogenous. Therefore the price level depends upon both the
nominal exchange rate and the world price for tradeable. Inﬂation depends
entirely on the nominal exchange rate.
I assumed that the (non-modelled) National Bank of Belgium has a gold
parity target, and implements monetary policy accordingly. This means that
the Bank cannot react to unilateral devaluations or revaluations by other
countries, as doing so would imply changing the gold content of the Belgian
franc. So the Bank limits herself to adjust the money supply in such a way
that the nominal parity of the Belgian franc with gold is compatible with the
trade balance.
Before taking the model to the Depression data, it is again interesting
to study the IRF of the model to three possible shocks. To this purpose,
Figures 20, 21, 22 and 23 plot the IRF to the three shocks separately. The
blue line is the IRF of the model to a 1% standard deviation positive shock
to the nominal exchange rate. The red line is the IRF of the model to a 1%
standard deviation positive shock to the tradeable sector productivity. The
black line is the IRF of the model to a 1% standard deviation positive shock
to the non-tradeable sector productivity.
First consider the productivity shock to the tradeable sector. The in-
creased eﬃciency in production causes the price of tradeables to decrease, as
before. However, given that the tradeable good is not the num´ eraire any-
more, such a decrease does not translate automatically into an inﬂationary
pressure. The price of imports stays constant, as it is now determined by
the nominal exchange rate and by the world price for tradeable goods, and
I assumed them both constant. In the previous exercise, we were unable to
make the distinction between the real and the monetary eﬀect of the TFP
variation. Here we can. If the nominal exchange rate could move in response
to the TFP shock, the IRF would have the same pattern as before. As it
20Those Countries together received about 62% of the total Belgian exports in 1929.
24happens, the constancy of the nominal exchange rate implies a deﬂationary
pressure instead. Exports increases, a consequence of the higher eﬃciency
of the domestic economy in producing tradeables. Imports increasing more
than exports, the current account witnesses a small deﬁcit lasting more than
10 periods. Imports increase out of an income eﬀect.
The shock to the productivity of tradeables causes output in the tradeable
sector to increase. The shift in the labour demand coupled with the wage
rigidity in the tradeable sector should cause an increase in the real wage we
do not apparently observe in the IRF. I say ‘apparently’, because what is
graphed as ‘wt’ is the wages expressed in terms of the num´ eraire. So, in this
model, ‘wt’ stands for the nominal wage. However, if the nominal wage is
deﬂated with the consumption price, the increase in the real wage becomes
appreciable. Hours worked in both sectors move little. The shock transmits
to the non-tradeable sector exactly as before, i.e. via the accumulation of
capital.
Consider now the productivity shock in the non-tradeable sector. A shock
on the non-tradeable TFP increases production in the non-tradeable sector
and decreases the relative price PN
PT . Mutatis mutandis, the transmission
mechanism within the non-tradeable sector via the labour demand is the
same as before. The same holds true for the transmission mechanism to the
tradeable sector, via the accumulation of capital. A feature which is note-
worthy is the greater overall impact of the TFP shock in the non-tradeable
sector vis ` a vis the TFP shock in the tradeable sector. Such a diﬀerence is
due in part to the role played by the rest of the world in inﬂuencing the dy-
namics of the tradeable sector. But most of the diﬀerence is explained by the
major weight that non-tradeables holds in the consumption and investment
aggregators.
As the nominal exchange rate remains stable, the shock to the productiv-
ity of the non-tradeables produces a decrease in exports on impact. Tradeable
good production has become relatively less eﬃcient. The initial positive in-
come eﬀect on imports is stronger than in the tradeable TFP shock case.
The two eﬀects combined imply a deeper deﬁcit of the current accounts that
lasts 10 years before turning into a surplus.
Finally, let us consider the IRF to the nominal exchange rate shock.21
A positive shock on e means a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate:
more Belgian francs are needed to buy one unit of the bundle-currency. As
expected, this has inﬂationary eﬀects on impact. Imports are costlier, exports
21As I have assumed that the National Bank of Belgium implemented monetary policy
by pegging the nominal exchange rate to gold, in this model a nominal exchange rate
shock is to be intended as a unilateral policy change by the foreign monetary authority.
25cheaper, yet the current account remains fully balanced. Apparently the real
exchange rate remains constant, with pM adjusting so a to oﬀset the variation
in e. Like any monetary shock, the temporary nominal exchange rate shock
has a short-lived impact on the real economy, due to the wage rigidity in
the tradeable sector. Notice that Equation (46) now describes a nominal
wage rigidity (wages are measured in terms of Belgian francs), as opposed
to the previous real model, where it described a real wage rigidity (wages
were measured in terms of tradeable good). The nominal wage rigidity in
the tradeable sector implies that the inﬂationary shock is not balanced by a
suitable increase in wT. This implies a decrease in the real wage measured
either as production cost (i.e. divided by pT), or as purchasing power (i.e.
divided by pc). Such a decrease has an obvious positive if not enduring
impact on the economy.
Now that the transmission mechanism of the model is clearer, it is time
to use the model to account for the Depression data.
If we assume that the 1929 exchange rate between the Belgian Franc
and the bundle currency is the equilibrium value, then we can interpret the
variations of e during the 1930s as exchange rate shocks, coming from the
interaction between the monetary policy of the National Bank of Belgium
and those of the other monetary authorities.
Given the calibration of the parameters, I fed in both the measured ex-
change rate and the TFP shocks, and studied the response of the monetary
model with nominal wage rigidity and bonds. Notice that, given that the
exchange rate gives us already the asymmetry we wanted, there is no reason
to limit the productivity shock to the tradeable sector only. Therefore, in
the simulations below the TFP shock aﬀects both the sectors.
The blue lines in Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 show the results from the simu-
lations.22
The model accounts for almost 50% of the cumulative drop in hours
worked between 1929 and 1934. The decrease in tradeable production in
the model accounts for almost all the observed cumulative drop of aggregate
output between 1929 and 1934. In 1934, output in the non-tradeable sector
is about 7% below trend in the simulation. The dynamics of imports and
exports are still not accounted for in a satisfactory manner. The improvement
for consumption is tiny as well. The model matches both the CPI and terms
of trade reasonably well, although, like the other models above, it is not
able to catch the CPI/PPI dynamics. The devaluation of the Belgian franc
22In an exercise not shown here, I have carried out the same simulations assuming perfect
foresight of both the TFP and the exchange rate shocks, instead of rational expectations
only. This was done to assess the robustness of the results, that indeed do not change
appreciably.
26with respect to the bundle-currency in 1934-35 makes room for a quasi-
recovery in some variables in the model, a feature at variance with the data.
This particularly true for hours worked, exports and output in the tradeable
sector.
All in all, the presence of monetary disturbances on the nominal exchange
rate increases the responsiveness of the model along some dimensions, al-
though it is not suﬃcient to account for all the available evidence.
6 Conclusions
The Great Depression of the 1930s has been the most dramatic business cycle
event of the last century. Once a strict domain of economic historians, it is
nowadays under scrutiny by macroeconomists, who have started to apply
their dynamic general equilibrium tools to the interpretation of this event.
This paper contributes to this literature by extending the analysis of the
Belgian case from a Neoclassical perspective started in a companion article
(Pensieroso (2007a)) to a full-ﬂedged open-economy dimension.
I have carried out the analysis on two benchmark scenarios, the one-good
and the two-good model, with ﬂexible prices and perfect competition.
Results show that in both the one-good and the two-good models, the
possibility of issuing bonds enhances the responsiveness of the model to the
TFP shock. This suggests that to catch the trade balance dynamics is likely
to be important to account for the Great Depression in Belgium. Such a
conclusion ﬁnds plain support in the work of leading historians.
The extended version of the two-good model that encompasses also real
wage rigidity in the tradeable sector improves on the results, suggesting that
the perverse combination of ﬂexible product prices and sticky production
costs might have played a role in the Depression. This result gives credit to
the analysis by renown historians of the period, like Cassiers (1989).
A ﬁrst extension that includes monetary features like the nominal ex-
change rate led to a further improvements of the results, particularly for
what concerns employment and price indices.
The analysis presented in this article allows for the explicit consideration
of trade related variables, price indices and the nominal exchange rate within
a DGE model applied to the Great Depression in Belgium. Its results are
qualitatively intriguing and quantitatively appreciable. This is a further step
towards a more complete analysis of the Great Depression from a neoclassical
perspective.
Several extensions of the present work are envisageable. First, the intro-
duction of capital adjustment costs in the models with bonds could lower the
27excessive volatility of investment in response to technological shocks.
Second, in the model with real wage rigidity, the assumed perfect labour
mobility across sectors partially oﬀset the eﬀect of the real wage rigidity in the
tradeable sector. Relaxing this assumption could enhance the responsiveness
of the model to the shocks.
A major shortcoming of all the models considered here is the slim reaction
of consumption to the diﬀerent shocks. A way to overcome this problem could
be to assume a lower degree of substitutability between the diﬀerent goods
in the consumption bundle. Another possible way out is the introduction
of habit persistence in the components of the consumption bundle, making
reallocation between diﬀerent goods slower.
Finally, this model is particularly well suited to study the eﬀects of tariﬀs.
As shown by Perri and Quadrini (2002) for the Italian case, tariﬀs and trade
barriers in general were an important source of disturbance for the world
economy in the 1930s. Although in my view the imposition of tariﬀs world-
wide was more a consequence than a possible cause of the Depression, still to
study the impact of tariﬀs on the Belgian economy might be a useful addition
to the analysis presented here. Particularly, because of the speciﬁc nature
of the Belgian economy, a small open economy whose industrial production
was export-oriented.
These extensions are left to future research.
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Figure 1: Data on prices, interest rates and selected exchange rates in Bel-
gium, 1929-1938. Indices, 1929=100. Source: Pensieroso (2007a)
































Employment and detrended real wages
 
 



























Figure 2: Data on detrended and undetrended output, its components, and
the labour market in Belgium, 1929-1938. Indices, 1929 = 100. Source:
Pensieroso (2007a)









































Figure 3: Simulation. One-good closed-economy versus open-economy model
with estimated tfp shocks































































Figure 4: IRF, model with TFP shocks in the tradeable sector



































































Figure 5: IRF, model with TFP shocks in the tradeable sector






























































Figure 6: IRF, model with TFP shocks in the tradeable sector




























Figure 7: IRF, model with TFP shocks in the tradeable sector




























































Figure 8: Simulations with the two-sector models. Red line: data. Green
line: model with TFP shocks in the tradeable sector. Black line: model with
bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable sector and TFP shocks in the tradeable
sector. Blue line: model with money, bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector, aggregate TFP shocks and exchange rate shocks.























































Figure 9: Simulations with the two-sector models. Red line: data. Green
line: model with TFP shocks in the tradeable sector. Black line: model with
bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable sector and TFP shocks in the tradeable
sector. Blue line: model with money, bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector, aggregate TFP shocks and exchange rate shocks.


















































Figure 10: Simulations with the two-sector models. Red line: data. Green
line: model with TFP shocks in the tradeable sector. Black line: model with
bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable sector and TFP shocks in the tradeable
sector. Blue line: model with money, bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector, aggregate TFP shocks and exchange rate shocks.

























































Figure 11: Simulations with the two-sector models. Red line: data. Green
line: model with TFP shocks in the tradeable sector. Black line: model with
bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable sector and TFP shocks in the tradeable
sector. Blue line: model with money, bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector, aggregate TFP shocks and exchange rate shocks.





























































Figure 12: IRF, model with bonds and TFP shocks in the tradeable sector
































































Figure 13: IRF, model with bonds and TFP shocks in the tradeable sector
























































Figure 14: IRF, model with bonds and TFP shocks in the tradeable sector












































Figure 15: IRF, model with bonds and TFP shocks in the tradeable sector
































































Figure 16: IRF, model with bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable sector and
TFP shocks in the tradeable sector

































































Figure 17: IRF, model with bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable sector and
TFP shocks in the tradeable sector



























































Figure 18: IRF, model with bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable sector and
TFP shocks in the tradeable sector











































Figure 19: IRF, model with bonds, wage rigidity in the tradeable sector and
TFP shocks in the tradeable sector
























































































Figure 20: IRF, model with bonds, nominal wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector, nominal exchange rate shocks and aggregate TFP shocks. Blue line:
IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive shock to the nominal exchange rate.
Red line: IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive shock to the tradeable sec-
tor productivity. Black line: is the IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive
shock to the non-tradeable sector productivity.






















































































Figure 21: IRF, model with bonds, nominal wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector, nominal exchange rate shocks and aggregate TFP shocks. Blue line:
IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive shock to the nominal exchange rate.
Red line: IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive shock to the tradeable sec-
tor productivity. Black line: is the IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive
shock to the non-tradeable sector productivity.

















































































Figure 22: IRF, model with bonds, nominal wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector, nominal exchange rate shocks and aggregate TFP shocks. Blue line:
IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive shock to the nominal exchange rate.
Red line: IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive shock to the tradeable sec-
tor productivity. Black line: is the IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive
shock to the non-tradeable sector productivity.

















































































Figure 23: IRF, model with bonds, nominal wage rigidity in the tradeable
sector, nominal exchange rate shocks and aggregate TFP shocks. Blue line:
IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive shock to the nominal exchange rate.
Red line: IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive shock to the tradeable sec-
tor productivity. Black line: is the IRF to a 1% standard deviation positive
shock to the non-tradeable sector productivity.
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